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Abstract. Since Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal and Weingast's 1998 collection Analytic 
Narratives, historians and political scientists have argued about their method, which 
essentially amounts to constructing case studies in economic and political history by using 
game theory. The present article describes their contribution before expanding on the 
methodological problems of "analytic narratives" more broadly. 
 
Résumé. Depuis que Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal and Weingast ont collectivement publié 
Analytic Narratives en 1998, les politologues et les historiens ont débattu de leur méthode, qui 
consiste pour l'essentiel à se servir de la théorie des jeux pour construire des études de cas en 
histoire économique et politique. L'article décrit leur contribution avant de développer les 
problèmes méthodologiques du "récit analytique" plus largement. 
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The expression "analytic narrative" sounds like an oxymoron. A narrative can be defined as a 
report of human actions and resulting events that makes the temporal order of these actions 
and events clear, with the primary purpose of making them intelligible to the public. There 
seems to be no concept of analysis that fits narratives; if anything, they are syntheses (of 
description and account, art and knowledge, entertainment and instruction). Still, the above 
expression has become a tag in today's social sciences, especially in the "political economy" 
literature that florishes at the crossroads of economics, politics, and history. Usually, it means 
little more than story-telling with significant theoretical underpinnings (for an example in this 
vein, see Rodrick's 2003 collection of "analytic narratives on economic growth"). But a few 
users of the expression are keenly aware of the paradox it raises, and for them, it means no 
less than a new approach to history, one which would be capable of reconciling the narrative 
mode of this discipline with the model-building activity of theoretical economics and politics. 
Prominent in this group are Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal and Weingast, whose 1998 
collection Analytic Narratives (henceforth AN) is the most sustained attempt to make sense of 
the tag, both in terms of methodological theorizing and concrete applications. This article will 
restate this double contribution before expanding on the issues more broadly. 
 
In the Middle Ages, the city-state of Genoa underwent a succession of peaceful consulate 
system, civil war between the leading families, and civil peace under a new political system, 
                                                
* An article prepared for The Encyclopedia of Political Science (J.E. Alt, S. Chambers, G. 
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the podesteria. The historians' best narratives fail to explain this sequence satisfactorily, and 
furthermore, to discern all the relevant questions; for instance, the first period was 
accompanied with a variable pattern of maritime activity in terms of raids and conquered 
possessions that also needs explaining. Greif responds by constructing two extensive form 
games of perfect information involving the clans as strategic players. The first explores their 
trade-off between maintaining mutual deterrence and participating in maritime operations. It 
accounts both for the variability within the first period and - using external threat as the 
variable parameter - its collapse into civil war. The second game, which the podestà enters as 
a player, rationalizes his stabilizing effect in the third period. Subgame perfect equilibrium is 
used to solve both games. Each period is first described in a pretheoretic narrative to clarify 
the open problems, second analyzed in a corresponding model, and third discussed and 
checked in another narrative that uses the theoretical language of the second stage. 
 
A classic historians' problem is to understand why France and England followed such 
different paces of institutional change in the 17th and 18th century, one country keeping the 
absolutist monarchy throughout, while the other gradually established representative 
government. Rosenthal's answer emphasizes the two countries' difference in fiscal structure. 
Given that the product of taxes was mostly spent on wars, this leads him to investigate how a 
country's style of warfare relates to its political regime. His argument combines standard 
narrative parts with the use of an extensive form game that is formalized in an appendix. The 
two players, the King and the elite (an abstraction representing the French and English 
parliaments, and the provincial estates where they existed in France) enjoy separate fiscal 
resources and try to make the best of them in fighting profitable wars. The King alone has the 
power of launching a war, and if he exerts it, the elite decides whether or not to participate 
financially. Since most wars need joint funding, there is a free rider problem which is more 
acute when the fiscal resources are shared than when they are in one player's hands; whence 
the prediction that wars are the more frequent, the higher the King's share of fiscal resources. 
For Rosenthal, France's absolutism was a case of sharing, whereas England's representative 
government was one of near control by the elite. So his model can be tested on the two 
countries, and if confirmed, it will illuminate the connection between their warfare and 
political regimes. However, it is unclear what it contributes to the initial question of their 
different paces of political change. 
 
In the 19th century, there was a trend in western states to reform military service in the 
direction of more or less universal conscription. Standard histories emphasize democratization 
and military efficiency, but the latter factor is unclear, and against the former, reforms took 
place either before (in Prussia) or later (in France and the USA) than universal suffrage 
prevailed. Starting from these objections, Levi narrates the changes in French and American 
regulations, attending not only to the chronological problem, but also to the technical forms of 
buying out one's military duty (substitution, replacement, commutation). Her narrative is 
analytic to the extent that it relies on an informal model in the spirit of formal political 
economy. The main actors are the government, which strives to employ the population 
efficiently, the constituents, who are divided into social classes with distinctive preferences, 
and a pivotal legislator, who aligns himself on the coalition prevailing among the classes. 
Hypothesized changes in the government's and the middle classes' preferences account for the 
observed change in regulations that is sensitive to its fine-grained features. 
 
Historians of the USA have long been puzzled by the relative stability of the federation 
through the decades before the Civil War. Classically, they argue that slavery became a 
divisive issue only after a while, and that the democratic party after Jackson managed a 
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successful coalition of southerner and northerner interests. Others put forward local political 
issues and changing economic conditions. Weingast combine these factors into a narrative 
that stresses explicit political arrangements, especially the "rule of balance" between slave and 
free states (they should remain equal in number to preserve the South's veto power in the 
Senate). Crises typically occurred when a new state was admitted. The first brought about a 
compromise that helped resolve the second, but did not work with the third. To keep an 
effective balance despite the continuing expansion to the West, the slave economy should 
have developed beyond its feasible limits; this is why conflict became unavoidable. 
Weingast's explanatory narrative accommodates three formal models, one of the spatial brand 
of mathematical politics, and the other two of the extensive form brand of game theory. They 
fully clarify his claim that the rule of balance was necessary to maintain federal stability. 
 
From 1962 to 1989, the International Coffee Organization regulated coffee prices by setting 
export quotas to its members, notably Brazil and Colombia, which were the main producers. 
The birth of ICO raises strategic issues that Bates addresses in an original format of narrative. 
He recounts the same event three times: Brazil and Colombia unsuccessfully tried to gather 
other coffee-producers; they brandished the communist threat to trap their main consumer, the 
USA, into their cartel organization; despite congressional reservations, the USA accepted the 
deal when their large coffee-selling companies supported it. Each partial narrative is followed 
by a formal argument – actually not a proper model – which supports it, but leaves an 
explanatory residual that motivates the next narrative step. Bates's discussion of the 
operations of ICO involves the same alternation.  
 
There is much common ground between the previous five studies. They begin with a set of 
historical problems that generally emerge from a critique of the extant literature; only the ICO 
case is too recent for such a reflective start. The problems often concern fine temporal 
patterns and variations that previous scholarship simply took for granted. A clear answer is 
finally given, which a modeling effort has contributed to shape. The authors' methodology 
emphasizes not only explanation, but also empirical testing. This is because their explanatory 
hypotheses, especially when they are duly formalized, deductively entail more than just the 
chosen explanandum. So there is room for independent testing, ideally by varying parameters 
such as Rosenthal's fiscal sharing ratio, but also less formally, as when Greif supports his 
account of podesteria in Genoa by discussing the form it took elsewhere. It is evident from 
the authors' related contributions that they believe to have uncovered theoretical patterns that 
can be transferred successfully; see e.g. Greif's (2006, ch. 6) "theory of endogeneous 
institutional change" in which he fits Genoa as a particular case. Still, it is dubious that the 
studies rely on genuine law-like regularities, and AN explicitly distances them from Hempel's 
"covering laws" theory of explanation. An unresolved methodological issue is to locate the 
new genre between this extreme construal and its alternatives, as in Dray (see Gardiner's 1974 
collection on the Dray-Hempel debate), or put more simply, to decide what the generality of 
the suggested explanations really consists of. 
 
The dissimilarities between the studies are no less striking, as they relate to the very concept 
that supposedly unites them. Greif and Bates develop a clear scheme of alternation between 
narration and analysis, with a ternary rhythm in Greif and more iterations in Bates (and 
correspondingly, more modelling in the former than the latter). In this conception, "analytic 
narrative" cannot mean a narrative that is also analytic, but a dual genre in which narratives 
and analyses cooperate for a common explanatory purpose while keeping their distinct 
identities. The two components exchange positions - the problems stemming sometimes from 
one, sometimes from the other, and similarly with the solutions – and influence each other 
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linguistically, but are never blurred. What conceptions the other contributors promote is not 
so explicit. Levi and Rosenthal introduce their technical concepts and hypotheses before 
proceeding to the narrative, whose foremost function seems to provide empirical evidence to 
check the hypotheses. Faithful to this hypothesis-testing conception, Levi carefully states the 
historical facts separately from the explanation they contribute to, but Rosenthal blurs the 
limits between the two, as if he were after the integrated form that Greif and Bates precisely 
exclude, i.e., a narrative made analytic. Exemplifying still another conception, Weingast 
introduces his hypotheses at the outset, but without technicalities, and his later models serve 
only to clarify part of them; in a sense, they confirm the narrative rather than the other way 
round. From this overview, one can distinguish four ideal-types of analytic narratives: 
alternation, hybridation, hypothesis-testing, supplementation.  
 
This classification is new to the methodology of analytic narratives. It is conceptually 
unrelated to, and arguably more significant than, the form and intensity of the modeling 
effort, which are also quite variable in AN. As comparisons across the book show, the 
formalized model may be solved to variable degrees of detail, depending on its inner 
complexity and, more subtly, the way it is used. The mathematical demands are not the same 
if the account is targeted at one or more historical situations, and at few or many selected 
features of these situations. Also, the model may be constructed for the purpose, as in Greif, 
Rosenthal and Weingast, or borrowed from the shelf, as in Bates. Levi's study does not 
involve a formal modeling stage, and critics like Elster (2000) have complained that such 
borderline cases were little more than standard narratives. Arguably, only modeling in 
principle, not actual modeling - this proposed distinction parallels a classic one in the 
philosophy of explanation - is essential to analytic narratives. In politics, international 
relations, military strategy, the new genre was predated by heuristic sketches rather than 
mathematical applications. Many of these sketches can be filled out, and it would seem 
arbitrary to keep them outside the door; see, e.g., Ferejohn (1991), Maurer (1992), Myerson 
(2004). Some topics have already gone through two stages of technicalities. Thus, the 1914 
diplomatic crisis was analyzed strategically first at a semi-formal level by Levy (1990-91), 
and second within a full-fledged model by Zagare (2009). 
 
To return to the AN contributors, their most obvious common ground is perhaps their 
involvement with game theory. Granting the plan of subjecting history to some theoretical 
framework, this one recommended itself to Greif, Levi, Weingast and Rosenthal, given their 
chosen cases. Empirical existence can be claimed for the collectives - clans, states, countries, 
social classes or interests - they deal with; furthermore, in the historical circumstances, these 
collectives could plausibly be endowed with feasible sets of actions, preferences, and strategic 
calculations. Game theory was perhaps not so appropriate for Rosenthal's wide-ranging 
explananda; he can employ it only after lumping together - e.g., in the "elite" - a large number 
of very different actors. Within game theory, AN claims a special status for extensive forms of 
perfect information and subgame perfection. Granting that the latter is a powerful equilibrium 
concept for the former, the two contentious issues are, how would analytic narrators solve 
extensive forms under imperfect information and why should they not sometimes employ 
normal forms? To see these alternative forms at work, take Haywood's (1954) penetrating 
analysis of World War II battles in terms of two-person zero-sum games – actually, the first 
application ever made of a game-theoretic technique to history.  
 
The AN contributors make occasional use of social choice theory, and they could have 
resorted more to decision theory, at least in the basic form of an expected utility apparatus. 
These two blocks are integral parts of the mathematical corpus of rational choice theory 
 5 
(RCT), so it is appropriate that the debate over analytic narratives has centered on their 
association with the compound rather than just game theory. Elster (2000) claims that they 
fail because the standard, already telling objections to RCT become absolutely irresistible in 
their case. For instance, the problem of checking for the actors' motivations, given that they 
are not observed, but conjectured from overt behavior, is dramatized by the information 
lacunae that are the historians' lot. Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal and Weingast (2000) respond 
both by defending RCT for lack of better alternatives and by arguing that their applications do 
not worsen its case.   
 
The present writer tends to agree with them, but would emphasize more than they do the 
relativity of success and failure. In social sciences generally, RCT has preferential 
explananda: human actions and their proximate consequences, when the actors are individuals 
or can be regarded as such, perform some deliberation or calculation, and their desires can be 
disentangled from their beliefs. The closer its case stands to this ideal point, the more 
promising the analytic narrative, and conversely, cases that depart on too many dimensions 
are bound to failure. A paradoxical consequence is that analytic narratives perform well in 
those areas in which ordinary narratives already do; this is because RCT and ordinary 
narratives share roughly the same preferential explananda (a thesis defended by Dray and 
other philosophers of history).  
 
These are the objective conditions, as it were, and there are others relative to the intellectual 
context. A convincing analytic narrative needs rooting into traditional history. There should 
be a problem neglected by the historians, but this problem, once brought to light, should 
attract them, and their inadequate records should be adequate enough for the solution arrived 
at analytically to be double-checked. This is a knife's edge, and there could be few candidates 
that survive in the end. 
 
Mongin's (2009) analytic narrative of the Waterloo campaign in June 1815 is meant to 
provide a decently favorable case along these stringent lines. (Campaign narratives, and 
military applications generally, appear to be a fertile area for the new genre; compare with 
Brams, 1975, and O'Neill, 1994.) Mongin starts from a gap in the extant narratives: they do 
not properly explain why Napoleon weakened himself before his decisive battle against 
Wellington by sending Grouchy's detachment against Blücher. This failure at answering a 
major historical question by ordinary means suggests trying a RCT model. Beside the 
contextual condition, the objective conditions are met paradigmatically – the explanandum 
being a single man's action, taken deliberatively in a limited context of uncertainty, in order to 
achieve a seemingly transparent objective of victory. Mongin introduces a zero-sum game of 
incomplete information in normal form. At the unique equilibrium, Napoleon's strategy 
consists in dividing his army, sending out Grouchy to prevent Blücher from joining 
Wellington. Eventually, nature played against Napoleon, and Grouchy messed up the orders, 
so the ex post failure is compatible with ex ante rationality. This is the claim of the pro-
Napoleonic literature, but rejuvenated by the technical apparatus. Here, the analytic narrative 
plays an arbitration role between historians, but elsewhere, it will provide them with new 
conclusions and, most importantly, new explananda to consider. 
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